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The Race to Safety: How Private Lawmaking
and Voluntary-Standard Adoption Can
Inspire a Global Regime that Strengthens and
Harmonizes Product Safety Standards
ALEXANDRA MUIR*
ABSTRACT
Today's economy is dominated by global actors. Over the past few
decades, transnational corporations have increased in number and
importance while domestic corporations have turned to outsourcing to
cut costs and increase efficiency. The globalized economy has caused a
breakdown in both physical and legal boundaries, as products in
international commerce move from one jurisdiction to another, often
adhering to safety standards of an entirely different jurisdiction than the
one in which they are sold. This breakdown raises concerns about
product safety and illustrates the importance of creating a consistent
products liability regime for the international market. At the same time,
consumer expectations and the high visibility of these large,
transnational actors have created an incentive for manufacturers to put
safe products in the market. With numerous market forces in play, this
Note suggests a regime that promotes private lawmaking and the
adoption of voluntary standards. Such a regime has the potential to
create consistent product safety standards across jurisdictions while
instituting a "race to the top" among these transnational actors.
INTRODUCTION
The global economy has evolved into a complex web of transnational
actors and markets that is not confined by legal or physical boundaries.
This evolution can be partly attributed to the increased number and
importance of transnational corporations (TNCs), whose presence has
risen dramatically since the 1980s. 1 Because these TNCs locate facilities
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all over the world without regard to any legal or jurisdictional
boundaries, they act as "footloose" actors who cannot be associated with
any one location or home base.2 The globalized nature of TNCs raises
questions about which laws and which criteria should govern their
operations. 3 In addition, even domestic companies have increased their
outsourcing of production to other countries (and thus have lost their
"domestic" status) in an effort to cut costs and increase efficiency. 4 The
trend of outsourcing causes domestic companies to face similar legal
complexities as those experienced by TNCs, as both of these global
trends have contributed to "the increased flow of capital, information,
and goods across borders," which has ultimately blurred the distinction
between foreign and domestic products. 5
As this distinction between foreign and domestic products becomes
hazy, so too does the determination of which country's law applies to
these products in international commerce. 6 In terms of products
liability, inconsistent or conflicting requirements between nations can
lead to a lack of predictable standards for manufacturers, causing
uncertainty as to which laws apply. 7 Because these manufacturers must
mass-produce and mass-market their products internationally, they find
it cumbersome, and often impossible, to comply with each nation's
conflicting laws and standards.8 These conflicting requirements "not
only discourage essential manufacturer planning and decision-making,
University. I would like to thank Professor Alfred C. Aman for providing me with
invaluable guidance throughout this note-writing process. I would also like to thank
Professor Jody L. Madeira for first introducing me to the world of products liability and for
providing helpful guidance throughout the revision process.
1. Gralf-Peter Calliess, Introduction: Transnational Corporations Revisited, 18 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 601, 606 (2011). The World Investment Report 2009 report explains
that roughly 82,000 transnational corporations exist worldwide. Id.
2. Id. at 607.
3. See id.; see also Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle:
Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF
GLOBAL REGULATION 44, 58-59 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009) (claiming that
the extent of national legal authority over foreign business operations remains unclear).
4. See e.g., Merrill Matthews, Companies 'Outsource' Because That's Where the Sales
Are, FORBES (July 20, 2012, 3:20 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/merrillmatthews
/2012/07/20/companies-outsource-because-thats-where-the-sales-are/ (claiming that
numerous U.S. companies are opening stores, building factories and hiring people
overseas because the largest growing markets are outside their domestic market).
5. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PATHWAY TO GLOBAL PRODUCT SAFETY AND QUALITY 2
(2011), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofGlobalRegulatory
OperationsandPolicy/GlobalProductPathwayUCM262528.pdf.
6. See Rebecca Korzec, Products Liability Harmonization: A Uniform Standard, 9 IUS
GENTIUM 25, 25 (2003).
7. See id. at 26-27.
8. Id.
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they also jeopardize product design and safety,"9 as many imported
products do not adhere to the domestic safety and design regulations of
the receiving country. 10
While an international uniform products liability regime may
appear to be the most obvious answer to the problems arising from
conflicting regulatory standards, this Note goes one step further to
argue for the creation of a harmonized global products liability regime
that actually increases safety standards. In today's global market, it is
necessary to strengthen both the certainty of which standards apply and
the stringency of the product safety standards. This Note sets out to do
both. Part I takes a closer look at the complexities of today's global
market that give rise to this inquiry and focuses on major TNCs whose
products have the potential to reach a significant portion of global
consumers. Part II discusses the competitive nature of today's global
market and addresses how this focus on competition has affected the
agendas of transnational actors. Part III discusses the effectiveness of
two private approaches to products liability laws that have the potential
to increase safety standards: private lawmaking and the adoption of
voluntary standards. This section addresses the strengths and
weaknesses of these two approaches-private lawmaking being strong
for increased safety standards but weak for harmonization, and
voluntary standards being strong for harmonization but weak for
increased standards. Finally, Part IV suggests how to utilize each of
these approaches in such a way that will not only increase safety
standards, but also harmonize these standards around the globe. This
Note proposes that voluntary-standard organizations and the companies
that adhere to their standards should engage in private lawmaking by
entering into contractual agreements regarding safety standards; these
contractual provisions will serve as baseline safety standards for the
manufacturers, thereby leaving room for market forces to institute a
"race to the top" for competing corporations in today's global market. In
order to incentivize TNCs to enter into contractual agreements with
voluntary- standard organizations, the standards developed should be
sufficient for all countries around the globe, thereby giving TNCs the
assurance that complying with these voluntary standards will allow
their products to be sold in any market in the world.
9. Id.
10. See generally Cary Coglianese et al., Consumer Protection in an Era of
Globalization, in IMPORT SAFETY: REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1
(Cary Coglianese et al. eds., 2009), available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/
faculty-scholarship/351 (detailing the risks that consumers face in today's global market).
325
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I. A CLOSER LOOK AT TODAY'S GLOBAL MARKET: THE COMPLEXITY, RISK,
AND NEED FOR A GLOBAL REGIME THAT INCREASES SAFETY STANDARDS
The competitive nature of today's global manufacturing market
creates incentives for outsourcing to locations where products can be
made cheaply and in mass quantities. 1 For example, China, which
possesses the world's largest manufacturing workforce of 104 million
people, has changed the way the entire global market operates: "China
has been able to successfully alter the competitive landscape of the
global marketplace by employing people in place of machines."12 This
characteristic of Chinese manufacturing produces goods at a low price,
which has become known as the "China price."13 It continues to be an
essential pricing factor of many global manufacturers because
consumers and companies demand cheap products in the market. 14
Unfortunately, the "China price" is also made possible because of
China's willingness to cut costs and essentially ignore safety measures,
an aspect of Chinese manufacturing that creates "unquantifiable risk
factors, primarily that the products may be defective or dangerous."15
Deficient government oversight, enforcement mechanisms riddled with
corruption, and a complete failure to regulate the safety of products in
production has allowed these unsafe products to enter the global
market.1 6 This risk factor has the potential to reach consumers in
countries around the globe, as China has rapidly become the world's
most important trade partner.17
A close look at the trend of outsourcing and the nature of Chinese
manufacturing suggests that globalization has played a role in placing
consumers at risk from dangerous or defective products. In order to
mitigate this risk, a globalized products liability regime must be created
in order to ensure the safety of consumers around the globe. The law of
products liability has two functions: first, to compensate injured victims,
11. See Matthews, supra note 4.
12. Stephanie Glynn, Note, Toxic Toys and Dangerous Drywall: Holding Foreign
Manufacturers Liable for Defective Products-The Fund Concept, 26 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
317, 325 (2012).
13. See id. at 324 (quoting ALEXANDRA HARNEY, THE CHINA PRICE 2 (2008)).
14. Cf. id. at 326 (arguing that the "China price" results from the demands of U.S.
consumers and companies for cheap goods).
15. Id.
16. See id. at 327-29.
17. See China Eclipses U.S. as Biggest Trading Nation, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Feb.
10, 2013, 11:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-09/china-passes-u-s-to-
become-the-world-s-biggest-trading-nation.html ("For so many countries around the
world, China is becoming rapidly the most important bilateral trade partner .... At this
kind of pace by the end of the decade many European countries will be doing more
individual trade with China than with bilateral partners in Europe.").
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and second, to act as a gate-keeper to ensure the safety of products
entering the market.18 This Note focuses on the second function-
ensuring the safety of products in the market-because the possibility of
creating a harmonized global regime that increases safety standards is
much more probable with respect to this function of products liability
law. There are two reasons for this. First, a focus on the first function of
products liability law-compensating injured victims-would not touch
off the race to the top that this proposal aims to achieve: "[T]here are
many policy areas, such as strict product liability, in which free trade
and economic competition would not generate a race-to-the-top dynamic.
Generally, race-to-the-top dynamics are likely to be limited to standards
concerning traded goods and services . "..."19 In contrast, focusing on the
second function of products liability law will concern traded goods
within the market and will therefore have a better likelihood of
resulting in a race-to-the-top dynamic. The second reason for focusing
on safety standards is that the legal nuances of each market are so
diverse that a harmonized regime for compensating victims is not a
probable solution. For example, even though in 1985 the European
Union adopted the Product Liability Directive, which closely mirrors
many concepts of the U.S. regime, their system continues to contrast
starkly with the U.S. regime as litigation remains rare, class actions are
unavailable in most member states, and the massive damage awards
common in the United States are altogether absent.20 These stark
differences, existent even in a jurisdiction that attempted to mirror the
U.S. regime in many ways, illustrates that a global regime
encompassing the compensation of injured victims is not a feasible
solution.
A closer look at manufacturing in Japan further illustrates why the
global regime must focus on safety standards rather than compensation.
Japan's products liability regime has evolved into one that is much more
stable and honest than the regime in China: Japan voluntarily adopted
products liability laws based on strict liability in 1993, which has led to
improvements such as more detailed warnings and instructions for
products, more legal review, products liability insurance, and more
detailed contracts with manufacturers and consumers. 21 Notably, these
improvements have created a safer environment for consumers and an
18. Geraint G. Howells, The Relationship Between Product Liability and Product
Safety-Understanding a Necessary Element in European Product Liability Through a
Comparison with the U.S. Position, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 305, 307 (2000).
19. R. Daniel Keleman & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Globalization of American Law, 58 INT'L
ORG. 103, 108 (2004).
20. See id. at 120-21.
21. See id. at 129-30.
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easier path to litigation, but they have not resolved all challenges for
global corporations operating in Japan. As illustrated by the 2009
Toyota acceleration recall, globalization continues to jeopardize product
safety. This recall, one of the largest in the history of the automotive
industry, ended in a settlement that amounted to more than a third of
Toyota's 2013 profit.22 Discussing the massive recall, Akio Toyoda,
Toyota's president and CEO, stated that the recall was the result of
Toyota's 'failure to connect the dots' as the company was receiving
information about the product failures from North America and Europe,
but the information wasn't finding it's [sic] way back to Corporate Japan
and the right department ...."23 This example illustrates that even the
development of a strict products liability regime cannot resolve all the
risks inherent in a global manufacturing operation, and thus indicates
that a regime focusing on safety standards may better address the
complexities within today's market.
Recent recall statistics provide further evidence of the inherent
risks of the globalized market. In 2010, product recalls were at record
numbers and had grown every year since 2004.24 In 2013, 22 million
vehicles were recalled, the highest number the market had seen in
nearly nine years.25 These statistics demonstrate that the products
liability regime currently in place is no longer protecting consumers in
the globalized market. It is true that manufacturers often voluntarily
recall defective products before more harm can result, allowing those
manufacturers to avoid costly litigation and high damage awards.
However, the mere existence of these defective products in the market is
still troubling-after all, many consumers will be harmed by the
defective product before a recall is initiated. Whether this increase in
recalls is caused by a lack of regulatory uniformity between importing
and exporting nations or a lack of communication within the supply
chain, it has become evident that consumer safety is at risk and that
something must be done, on a global scale, to lessen this risk. Recall
rates indicate that today's safety standards may not be high enough, so
22. Danielle Douglas & Michael A. Fletcher, Toyota Reaches $1.2 Billion Settlement to
End Probe of Accelerator Problems, WASH. POST (Mar. 19, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.comlbusiness/economy/toyota-reaches- 12-billion-settlement-to-
end-criminal-probe/2014/03/19/5738a3c4-af69-11e3-9627-c6502ld6d572_story.html.
23. Randall Goodden, Understanding the Continuous Cause of Product Recalls &




25. See Cheryl Jensen, Safety Agency Says 22 Million Vehicles Recalled in 2013, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/04/automobiles/safety-agency-says.
22-million-vehicles-recalled-in-2013.html?_r=1.
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a regime that inspires a race to the top among manufacturers is
desirable for consumer protection. Moreover, the lack of uniformity
among nations has been a constant cause of frustration for
manufacturers, so a regime that harmonizes standards across the globe
would provide certainty and allow manufacturers to comply more easily
with the legal requirements of their industry. 26
In order to ensure the safety of consumers around the globe, safety
norms must be created and harmonized, but they also need to be
implemented and enforced. This Note focuses on two private approaches
to products liability in order to illustrate the role of private actors in
today's globalized market: "In local, transnational, and international
law-making processes ... the role of non-legal actors ... often appears
to dominate ... the production or adoption of new legal categories and
concepts." 27  This proposal is geared primarily toward major
manufacturing companies, as the circumstances surrounding these
companies provide the ideal setting for the adoption and enforcement of
a safety standard regime. First, a global regime is more likely to have
success among these major global actors. Mauro Zamboni notes that
globalization processes can fail for a number of reasons: global actors
can reject certain global legal categories, for example, or the circulation
of legal models can be hindered by unique conditions within each legal
market.2 For these major global actors, however, their success relies on
the globalization of capital and products; these companies rely on the
ability of their products to be marketed and sold around the globe in a
wide range of markets. Because these companies depend on
globalization of their products, they cannot afford to reject the
globalization processes. In addition, because the products manufactured
by each of these companies have the highest potential to reach a large
number of consumers around the globe,29 a regime that increases safety
standards for these companies will have the potential to protect more
consumers in the market. Finally, the proposed regime relies entirely on
private, voluntary lawmaking, which can only work among corporations
26. See Korzec, supra note 6, at 25-33 (arguing that a uniform approach is the most
effective means of creating safer products in a global economy).
27. Mauro Zamboni, Globalization and Law-Making: Time to Shift a Legal Theory's
Paradigm, 1 LEGISPRUDENCE 125, 134 (2007).
28. See id. at 136.
29. See, e.g., Figures: Market/Toyota Sales and Production, TOYOTA GLOBAL SITE,
http://www.toyota-global.com/company/profile/figures/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2015)
(illustrating the global reach of Toyota, the world's largest car manufacturer, into North
America, Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and Oceania).
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that have the most at stake, as they tend to adopt voluntary initiatives
in order to build credibility in the eyes of the global society. 30
II. COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: THE DRIVING FORCE IN TODAY'S GLOBAL
MARKET AND THE BEACON OF HOPE FOR AN INCREASE IN SAFETY
STANDARDS
The competitive nature of today's global market and the role
competition plays in the decision-making process of each global
manufacturer provide the foundation for the success of private
lawmaking as a regulatory regime. Because these large, global
corporations live and die by the actions of consumers, they are
constantly competing with one another for consumer approval and
loyalty. 31 This competition leads these global corporations to adopt self-
regulating standards that impact not only their own operations but also
the operations of their supply chain.32 This section proposes that in
today's global market, the risks created by the modern risk society33 are
defined by consumers, who have become the driving force of competition
among global manufacturers. Consumer-defined risks have caused a
shift in the way global manufacturers operate, leading to an increase in
private lawmaking and self-regulation. While the discussion of
corporate self-regulation has largely been contained to areas of labor,
environmental governance, and human rights law, 34 this section
proposes that private lawmaking and regulation also have a place
among global products liability law-specifically, product safety
standards.
Ulrich Beck's theory of the modern risk society proposes that
modern society organizes itself according to risk through a process
called "reflexive modernization," meaning that the logic of risk
production dominates the logic of wealth production, thereby allowing
risk to be the driving force behind the actions of those in modern
30. See Kevin T. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and Reputational
Accountability, 35 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 41, 45-46 (2010).
31. See id. at 86 (discussing the impact of citizen campaigns on the voluntary actions of
global corporations, as the latter pressures transnational companies to behave with
increased responsibility).
32. See id.
33. The term "risk society" was coined by German sociologist Ulrich Beck. See generally
ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY (Mark Ritter trans., Sage
Publications 1992) (establishing risk as the driving force behind the actions and decisions
made in modern society).
34. See Jackson, supra note 30, at 86 (citing David Vogel, Private Global Business
Regulation, 11 ANN. REV.POL. SCi. 261, 268 (2008)).
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society.35 Beck argues that, in modern society, human activity creates
manufactured risks, and these risks, which transcend class and
geographical boundaries, are what guide the actions and inactions of
actors in the market. 36 Beck states that market actors use each other to
define risk: "One hazardous product might be defended by dramatizing
the risks of the [other hazardous products]." 37 Beck suggests that the
actors who get to define risk hold all the power in the market, as they
defend their own risks by exposing the risks caused by others.38 Beck
wrote in the early 1990s, but now, two decades later, the introduction of
social media has made disasters arising from defective products much
more visible to consumers, as knowledge of such disasters and
subsequent negative media coverage can spread worldwide in a matter
of seconds. 39 Because consumers are now empowered with information
and the ability to spread information around the globe almost instantly,
the power to define risk now lies in the hands of consumers.
The fact that consumers now hold the power to define risk has
changed the way global manufacturers operate, as they are now at the
mercy of consumers' risk definitions and find themselves competing
with one another to improve product safety and thus improve their own
risk definition among consumers. 40 This aspect of today's global market
was known to Beck, as illustrated by his discussion of the consumer
impact of these risk definitions. Beck states that risks are subject to
public criticism, 41 as "every socially recognized 'cause' [of a risk] comes
under massive pressure for change," and "[e]ven if this public pressure
is fended off, sales drop, markets collapse and the 'trust' of customers
has to be won back and strengthened by large, expensive advertising
campaigns." 42 Beck writes about the impact of risk on consumer actions
with the understanding that the manufacturers are defining the risk;
today, however, consumer actions can have an even bigger effect,
depending on how consumers choose to define the risk: "[T]he degree to
which consumers will punish manufacturers for unsafe products or
reward them for safe products clearly depends on the information that
consumers have about product safety, and they have many sources of
35. See BECK, supra note 33, at 12-13.
36. See id. at 21-24.
37. Id. at 31.
38. See id.
39. See The Toyota Recall: A Public-Relations Disaster? NEWSWEEK (Feb. 2, 2010, 7:00
PM), http://www.newsweek.com/toyota-recall-public-relations-disaster-74961.
40. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1443 (2010).
41. BECK, supra note 33, at 13.
42. Id. at 32.
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such information available to them."43 The degree to which consumers
will punish or reward manufacturers depends on the risk definitions
created within the consumer market, and the punishment or reward
will be the consumers' tendencies to purchase products with a low-risk
definition and avoid products with a high-risk definition. For this
reason, manufacturers must get out ahead of these consumer-generated
risk definitions to define themselves as low-risk manufacturers as
compared to their competitors, so they may maintain their competitive
advantage within the market.44
Risk definitions are not the only source of competition within today's
global market. Rather, the competitive nature of today's market creates
a conflicting dynamic, as manufactures must provide cheap products for
the market and simultaneously avoid any negative risk definitions
resulting from outsourcing of labor and production. For example,
manufacturers are attracted to production in China because it offers a
competitive advantage in terms of cheap labor and production costs, but
the attractiveness of this strategy has lessened in recent years. 45 One
reason for this is that, in the global economy, "goods produced in one
country might result in liability and regulatory concerns in another
country where they are sold and used."46 New risks have emerged for
those who choose to enter their products into the worldwide market,
causing companies to respond not to the risk of disaster, but to the risk
of legal liability. 47 The process of learning from disaster 48 certainly still
has a place in today's global market:
The recent Toyota [acceleration recall] was a major
wake-up call for manufacturers, as was the BP disaster
43. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 40, at 1445-46.
44. Consumer-defined risks do not impact all markets in the world, and specifically do
not impact markets where consumers are not as informed or knowledgeable about the
existence of risk. For example, in 2013, three of the world's largest car manufacturers
were accused of selling sub-standard vehicles, which did not meet the most basic safety
standards, to consumers in Latin America. Because the consumers in this market are less
likely to have their own risk definitions, manufacturers can take advantage of their
vulnerability by selling sub-standard products. See Jo Confino, Car Manufacturers
Accused of Lower Safety Standards in Latin America, THE GUARDIAN (July 24, 2013, 10:16
AM), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-businessblog/car-manufacturers-criticised-
safety-latin-america.
45. George J. Siedel & Helena Haapio, Using Proactive Law for Competitive
Advantage, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 641, 645 (2010).
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. See generally LEARNING FROM DISASTER: RISK MANAGEMENT AFTER BHOPAL (Sheila
Jasanoff ed., 1994) (discussing the process by which companies respond to and learn from
large industrial disasters in such a way that improves the safety of their processes).
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a wake-up call for corporate management practices, and
as is usually the case, it many times takes a high profile
disaster for others to finally pay attention to what needs
to be done within their own companies. 49
Today, however, disasters have proven to be so detrimental to a
manufacturer's competitive advantage that companies 50 can no longer
afford the risk. Past disasters also demonstrate that the consumer and
investor response is to stop buying products from and investing in
companies that place consumers in harm's way.51 For example, Takata
Corporation, which recently received international attention for
producing faulty airbags for many of the world's major automobile
manufacturers, experienced a record plunge in Tokyo trading after
Toyota advised U.S. consumers about the faulty airbags. 52 The
company's stock fell by 23 percent, the biggest drop since the company
was listed in 2006, and it expects to suffer a net loss of $226 million.53
When these high-visibility corporations create a defective product
with the potential to compromise the health and safety of millions of
consumers around the globe, they risk taking a significant hit, whether
that be entering a settlement for a third of the company's yearly profit
like Toyota 54 or dropping in sales and investment like Takata5 5 and
Odwalla. 56 The high visibility of certain manufacturers and their
products in the global market (owing largely to the existence of the
Internet) creates a much larger risk for the company when it introduces
dangerous products into the market. Major manufacturers are learning
that they can no longer afford these risks if they want to maintain a
favorable risk definition among consumers and thus maintain
49. Goodden, supra note 23.
50. The impact of market forces and competitive advantage is important for companies
that manufacture widely sold products with salient risks; however, market forces do not
play as large of a role for companies who produce products that are not widely sold, where
the risk of harm is unknown or not as widely publicized. In these scenarios, market forces
are unlikely to provide incentives to increase product safety. See Polinsky & Shavell,
supra note 40, at 1449.
51. See, e.g., id. at 1444 ("Odwalla's sales of natural juices declined by 90% in 1996
after one person died and sixty others were made ill by consuming some of its products
containing E. coli bacteria." (citations omitted)).
52. See Ma Jie & Yuki Hagiwara, Takata Falls by Record Amid Escalating Air-Bag
Recall, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Oct. 21, 2014, 12:36 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2014-10-21/takata-drops-by-record-in-tokyo-trading-as-air-bag-recall-widens.
53. Id.
54. See Douglas & Fletcher, supra note 22.
55. See Jie & Hagiwara, supra note 52.
56. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 40, at 1444.
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competitive advantage in the market.57 The desire of manufacturers to
please consumers by avoiding risk has the potential to spur private
lawmaking, which can ultimately improve safety standards. 58 The next
section analyzes private lawmaking within today's global market and its
ability to increase safety standards among global actors. Specifically, it
examines the adoption of voluntary standards as a way to harmonize a
potential global products liability regime.
III. PRIVATE APPROACHES TO PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THEIR POTENTIAL
TO INCREASE SAFETY STANDARDS AND ACHIEVE HARMONIZATION
Private lawmaking is the process by which a private group makes
rules that can govern much larger groups, and the idea encompasses the
ability of private actors to make law that governs corporate, commercial,
and consumer behavior.5 9 In Section A, I refer to "private lawmaking" as
the process by which the manufacturer, as the private actor, makes
rules to govern itself and its suppliers and enforces those rules through
contractual drafting. In utilizing this lawmaking process, these private
actors have the ability to impose rules on themselves that are in fact
more stringent than the regulatory requirements enforced by
government agencies. In Section B, I discuss voluntary standards, which
are another form of private lawmaking in which private institutions
draft and publish standards that are then adopted by companies on a
voluntary basis without government enforcement. 60
A. Global Products Liability Through Private Lawmaking: Good for
Increasing Safety Standards, Not So Good for Harmonization
When manufacturers engage in private lawmaking, they take
advantage of a lawmaking regime that utilizes various actors in the
market: consumer forces dictate consumer expectations to
manufacturers, who may include provisions into their contracts based
on these consumer expectations; the media can hold these companies
57. See id. at 1443.
58. This potential improvement in safety standards is contained within the realm of
large volume, high visibility manufacturers who "have more to lose if consumers think
that their products are dangerous and more to gain if consumers believe that their
products are safe, giving them a greater inventive to invest in product safety." Id. at 1449.
59. See David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371, 371 (2003).
60. See Joseph J. Lazzara, Safeguarding: Are ANSI Standards Really Voluntary?,
ANSI (Dec. 2004), http://www.ansi.orgtnews-publications/other-documents/safeguarding.
aspx?menuid=7 (discussing the process of voluntary standards creation and adoption for
the American National Standards Institute, which is a private voluntary standard
organization in the United States).
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accountable for accidents such as disasters and mass recall events that
may expose a lack of adherence to these privately made standards; and
the contractual provisions created through private lawmaking allow the
law to compel the manufacturers to do what they say they will.
First, consumers are quickly becoming the dominant actor in today's
global market, as they are the ones that will ultimately be affected by
and expose the manufacturer for a lack of compliance with safety
standards.6 1 Ulrich Beck notes that victims in global risk positions,
which, in terms of products liability, means consumers whose health
and safety can be compromised by the actions of manufacturers, become
unified.62 This unification of consumers spurs the need to "find and
enforce solutions to the self-inflicted endangering that crosses all
borders"6 3-the "self-inflicting endangering" referring to manufactured
risks.
Second, private lawmaking utilizes manufacturers within the
market. The unified consumer 64 market force provides an "incentive [for
manufacturers] to improve product safety, for if consumers believe that
the risk of a product is high, they will either avoid buying the product or
will not pay as much for it as they otherwise would."6 5 In today's global
market, which has utilized technology to become more unified than
ever, corporations must "begin partnering with the rising tide of
customers who can now demand new standards for corporate behavior
and a higher commitment to purpose, not just profit."66 Today, the role
of private actors and manufacturers in creating and enforcing
international law has become increasingly important. 67 One reason for
this is the inability of state regulation to act swiftly in response to
disasters. Regulatory agencies often have limited resources that only
allow them to address a few safety problems at one time, which
61. See Mathias Reimann, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the
Twenty-First Century: Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 AM. J. COMp. L. 751, 759-
60 (2003).
62. See BECK, supra note 33, at 47 ("[Tlhe risk society produces . . . a new type of
community of the endangered .... [It] develops a tendency to unify the victims in global
risk positions.").
63. Id. at 47-48.
64. By "unified consumers," I mean consumers in global risk positions who have access
to information regarding these risks and the ability to impact the market through their
purchase or avoidance of high-risk products. Consumers become unified with respect to
specific products that pose a risk to health and safety. Cf. id.
65. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 40, at 1443.
66. Simon Mainwaring, The New Power of Consumers to Influence Brands, FORBES
(Sept. 7, 2011, 1:46 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/simonmainwaring/2011/09/07/the-
new-power-of-consumers-to-influence-brands.
67. See Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1574-75
(2011).
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essentially means that, as one safety problem is addressed, many others
go by the wayside. 68 As safety risks become known to the consumer
populace, manufacturers must act independently of regulatory agencies
in order to maintain their positive reputation and favorable risk
definition among consumers. The debate over the safety of bisphenol A
(BPA), a chemical used in plastic manufacturing, provides an excellent
illustration of the influence consumers have on today's market.69 After
putting a significant amount of time and money into research, agencies
of six different governments and various scientific studies have
determined that BPA is safe as used by today's market; nevertheless,
large companies such as Wal-Mart and Toys "R" Us have refused to sell
baby bottles made with BPA.7 0 These retailers did not base their
decisions on safety only, but rather on "what will or will not motivate
consumers." 71 By banning the use of BPA in products, these retailers
have engaged in private lawmaking that imposes harsher restrictions
on their operation than the law requires.
The final two actors that private lawmaking utilizes-the media and
law enforcement-ensure that these companies actually adhere to these
self-created standards. Product liability cases already receive much
attention from the media, 72 and the use of social media has allowed
consumers to strongly influence business practices by exposing the
negative and positive actions of companies.7 3 In terms of enforcement,
the nature of private lawmaking through contractual obligations with
buyers, suppliers, or retailers allows legal enforcement to exist when
one party breaches a duty required by the contract. When a company
simply imposes safety standards on itself (such as Wal-Mart and Toys
"R" Us refusing to sell BPA products), consumer forces hold the
companies accountable by exposing any lack of compliance with their
claimed standards.7 4
The recent actions of two global manufacturers, Toyota and Mattel,
illustrate the trend of private lawmaking in the global market. First,
not long after the massive acceleration recall that permeated the
Internet and traditional media, Toyota announced that it plans to be the
68. See Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products
Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1151-52 (1988).
69. See Pat Rizzuto, Bisphenol A Debate Transforms Toxicology as Market Forces




72. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 40, at 1439.
73. See Mainwaring, supra note 66.
74. See id. ("Social media gives [consumers] ... a means to punish irresponsible
corporate behaviors.").
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first mainstream automaker to offer high-tech crash avoidance systems
on all of its 2017 models-an announcement made at a safety conference
in 2014.75 The reasoning behind Toyota's actions are clear: "Automakers
are competing on safety, so they're using safety technology as a way to
get a leg up on their competitors."7 6 Toyota's announcement could spur
actions from other automakers to meet these same safety
requirements, 77 ultimately producing an increase in safety standards
free from government mandate. While Toyota has just recently made
this announcement, the goal is that by 2017, these safety requirements
will be placed in all of Toyota's contracts with its suppliers and retailers,
thus creating an enforceable safety standard. This example illustrates
the power of the market, driven by competitive advantage, to increase
safety standards solely by a company's private actions.
The second example concerns Mattel, an American toy
manufacturer that has also engaged in private lawmaking in recent
years. In light of massive recalls for Chinese-made products that
contained high levels of lead in 2007, Mattel instigated a three-stage
safety check for lead paint, restructured its quality oversight by adding
a new product policy and audit program, and created a corporate
responsibility group. 78 While this private lawmaking regime ensures
that Mattel will perform due diligence in inspecting these Chinese
imports, any contract between Mattel and its Chinese importer may
contain product specification provisions and safety standards that the
Chinese manufacturer or supplier must abide by, since any act of
noncompliance by the Chinese exporters will result in a breach of
contract and an ultimate claim against that Chinese entity. 79 The act of
writing these heightened standards into contractual provisions also
expands the reach of the increased safety regime and can result in
increased standards, not just in one country or for one company, but in
all companies connected by the global chain, regardless of location.
Private lawmaking does have the potential to increase safety
standards on a global scale, but it cannot provide a global solution to the
product liability complexities in today's market. One reason is that
while incentives provided by market forces are strong for widely sold
products, they are not nearly as strong or influential for products that
75. James R. Healey, Toyota: High-tech Safety Gear for All Models Soon, USA TODAY




78. Hao Huang, Note, Maximizing Chinese Imports' Compliance with United States
Safety and Quality Standards: Carrot and Stick From Whom?, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
131, 132-33 (2008).
79. See id. at 147.
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are not widely sold.8 0 Additionally, private regulation has resulted in
safety improvements for global corporations, but it cannot substitute
regulatory authority at the state or international level.8 1 This is largely
because of the tension that still remains for companies aiming to gain
competitive advantage: while market forces incentivize improved safety
standards, the economic pressures to have low-cost production and sales
simultaneously incentivize outsourcing as a means to provide
reasonably priced products that consumers desire.8 2 The case of Mattel
provides an illustration of this tension: "Although Mattel recalled
millions of Chinese-made toys in 2007, incurring economic and
reputational damage, the company continues to outsource its
manufacturing to China."8 3 Finally, while private lawmaking does have
the potential to increase safety standards, the underlying goal of this
process is for companies to create safety standards that are more
stringent than those of competitors-an idea that stands in stark
contrast to the goal of harmonization. A global regime that increases
safety standards is one goal that this proposal aims to achieve, but the
other goal is harmonization, an equally important aspect of a global
approach to products liability.
B. Global Products Liability Through the Adoption of Voluntary
Standards: Good for Harmonization, Not So Good for Increasing Safety
Standards
The idea of voluntary standards is to utilize both public and
governmental actors in the market to create and publish voluntary
standards, for both domestic and international companies.8 4 Voluntary-
standard organizations, which bring together industry groups,
government agencies, and consumer groups, collaborate with one
80. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 40, at 1449.
81. See David Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct:
Achievements and Limitations, 49 BUS. & SOC'Y 68, 69, 83 (2010) ('Voluntary business
regulation has emerged as a response to the failures or shortcomings of existing legal
mechanisms of regulatory governance in the global economy .... But 'private approaches
towards global governance are not a substitute for public policy, but rather an imperfect
addition' to it." (citing Sander Chan & Philipp Pattberg, Private Rule-Making and the
Politics of Accountability: Analyzing Forest Governance, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., August
2008, at 103, 118)).
82. See Glynn, supra note 12, at 332.
83. Id. at 333.
84. See generally Introduction to ANSI: Overview of the U.S. Standardization System:
Voluntary Consensus Standards and Conformity Assessment Activities, ANSI,
http://www.ansi.org/about-ansi/introduction/introduction.aspx?menuid=l (last visited
Nov. 17, 2014).
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another to develop safety standards for consumer products.8 5 While the
creation and adoption of voluntary standards is a form of private
lawmaking, it is different from the kind of private lawmaking discussed
in Section A. The adoption of voluntary standards is like private
lawmaking in that companies have the ability to play a role in the
rulemaking process through involvement in the voluntary-standard
organization.8 6  Companies may take part in the collaborative
rulemaking process in order to influence the rules that are ultimately
created.8 7 It is unlike private lawmaking in that the company does not
have independent discretion to promulgate standards for itself, as the
voluntary-standard organization is a collaborative effort--one that
includes government agencies and consumer groups in the discussion.8 8
The private lawmaking discussed in Section A allows companies to
essentially decide standards for themselves and implement those
standards through contractual obligations, a process that does not
require participation from any other interested parties. Further,
voluntary standards do not inherently have the force of law like
contractual provisions do.8 9 Government agencies may adopt these
voluntary standards as mandatory standards and companies may
choose to write these standards into their contracts, but without further
action these standards have no inherent enforceability. 90 Finally,
because many companies can and often do comply with these voluntary
standards, 91 adherence to these guideline often does not give companies
the same competitive advantage of private lawmaking. With the private
lawmaking discussed in Section A, companies may embark on bold,
innovative challenges that set them apart from other competitors in the
85. Voluntary Standards, UNITED STATES CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N,
http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Regulations-Laws--StandardsNoluntary-Standards/ (last visited
Nov. 17, 2014).
86. See About ANSI, ANSI, http://www.ansi.org/about-ansi/overview/overview.aspx?
menuid=1 (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
87. See Tyler R.T. Wolf, Existing in a Legal Limbo: The Precarious Legal Position of
Standards-Development Organizations, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 807, 818 (2008)
(discussing the potential for industry-members to influence the standards-development
process).
88. See UNITED STATES CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, supra note 85.
89. See Lazzara, supra note 60; see also David A. Wirth, The International
Organization for Standardization: Private Voluntary Standards as Swords and Shields,
36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79, 81 (2009) ("ISO standards are strictly hortatory and are
not binding under international law." (citing Ira R. Feldman & Douglas Weinfield,
Environmental Management Systems, in 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE: STATE
AND FEDERAL LAW § 6A (Michael Gerrard ed., 2008)).
90. See Lazzara, supra note 60.
91. See Wirth, supra note 89, at 83 ("ISO standards have a high profile within
multinational corporations.").
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market.92 Voluntary standards, on the other hand, are open to all who
wish to comply and sometimes become mandatory when they are
adopted into law, so companies that choose to adhere are often on a level
playing field with other competitors in the market.
Despite their shortcomings, voluntary standards are the closest
thing the global market has to a "uniform" products liability regime, and
it has served as an effective way to harmonize the global market. 93 This
harmonization is made possible by the existence of both domestic and
international standard-developing organizations that work together to
promote uniformity within the global market. To illustrate this
dynamic, this Note examines the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI) and the Internal Organization for Standardization
(ISO).94
ANSI is a private, not-for-profit organization that oversees the
development of voluntary standards in the United States. 95 ANSI
approves and accredits standards that are developed by other standards
organizations, such as the American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM).96 The mission of ANSI is "[t]o enhance both the global
competitiveness of U.S. business and the U.S. quality of life by
promoting and facilitating voluntary consensus standards and
conformity assessment systems, and safeguarding their integrity."97 Not
only does ANSI dedicate much of its work to harmonizing safety
standards on a global scale, it also acts as the official U.S.
representation in ISO, which is an international organization of
standardizing bodies from 157 countries. 98 These ISO standards are
unlike any other products liability regime that exists in today's global
market, as they have a potentially global reach: "[A] large proportion of
the countries on the planet participate in ISO activities, and ISO
standards have a high profile within multinational corporations." 99
92. See, e.g., Healey, supra note 75 (discussing Toyota's innovative actions to improve
the safety technology of future models).
93. See Frequently Asked Questions, ANSI, http://www.ansi.org/about-ansi/faqs/faqs.
aspx?menuid=l (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (answering the question of "Does ANSI work
only within the United States?); see also Wirth, supra note 89, at 79 ("ISO standards have
a number of benefits, including promoting international uniformity.").
94. ANSI serves as the official U.S. representative to the ISO. See ANSI, supra note 93
(answering the question of "Who are ISO and IEC?").
95. See ANSI, supra note 86.
96. Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development
of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REv. 1329, 1342
(1978).
97. ANSI, supra note 86.
98. See Wirth, supra note 89, at 80-81.
99. Id. at 83.
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While the global harmonization potential of these voluntary
standards is significant, this regime is unlikely to provide the increase
in safety standards that is desirable for consumer protection. These
standards involve a voluntary consensus within these standardizing
bodies, which "generally means widespread acceptance after lengthy
consultation."'100 ISO standards are not likely to drive industries to
make improvements, and, in fact, that the ISO process produces
"modest, least-common-denominator" standards is a frequently voiced
concern.' 0' Moreover, these voluntary standards actually dissuade the
creation of standards that are above and beyond the present norms:
when these technical committees meet to generate voluntary consensus
standards, "[ijt is not uncommon for [them] to be content with the status
quo even though someone has devised something that is as good or
better." 02
Even though this process is not likely to increase safety standards
among actors in the market, a significant strength of the voluntary
standard regime is that manufacturers have often been eager to help
develop and comply with voluntary standards, not only to disprove
negligence or fault in product liability claims, but also to market
themselves as safe and reliable within both the national and
international market. 0 3 Further, a recent study conducted and
published by the Government Accountability Office 0 4 (GAO) noted that
consumer product safety experts claim that "the risk of incurring
reputational and financial costs associated with product liability
lawsuits provides an incentive for manufacturers to comply with
voluntary standards."' 05 Courts consider compliance with voluntary
standards in determining negligence, fault, or the existence of a product
defect, and if a manufacturer can prove compliance with these
standards, this may defeat a plaintiffs claim for product defect or
negligence. 0 6
100. Id. at 87.
101. Id.
102. Hamilton, supra note 96, at 1376.
103. See Howells, supra note 18, at 310.
104. The U.S. Government Accountability Office is an independent, nonpartisan agency
that supports Congress in meeting constitutional responsibilities and works to improve
the performance and accountability of the federal government. See About GAO, GAO,
http://gao.gov/about/index.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
105. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-582, CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
COMMISSION: A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN VOLUNTARY STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT SHOULD IBE
CONSIDERED 10 (2012).
106. Id. Evidence of compliance with voluntary standards is, of course, not sufficient on
its own to negate liability for the manufacturer. Id. at 10, n.17.
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 23:1
Just as private lawmaking cannot, by itself, provide the kind of
global products liability solution that the market needs, voluntary
standards are not by themselves adequate for a global regime. First,
these voluntary standards do not have the force of law, and
governmental agencies such as the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (CPSC) cannot compel compliance from manufacturers.1 0 7
In fact, legal action cannot be taken against manufacturers for
noncompliance until an agency has determined that noncompliance has
posed a significant risk of injury or death for consumers.1 08 Further, the
National Commission for Product Safety'0 9 (NCPS) has noted that in the
past, voluntary industry regulation has failed to create and implement
adequate safety standards, most notably because industry rarely
complies with these standards to the degree necessary to ensure that
only safe products are entering the market. 110 To exemplify this
shortcoming, the GAO noted that from 2008 to 2011, 80 percent of
recalls in the United States were for products that may have been
subject to voluntary standards."' The GAO also noted that certain
industries actually prefer and have sought out mandatory standards for
two reasons: "[F]irst, to level competition across an industry sector,
especially where some manufacturers were not complying with the
voluntary standard to which the rest of the industry agreed; and second,
to preempt divergent state laws."'1 2
Furthermore, the voluntary-standard regime has the potential to
create a perverse incentive: because voluntary regulations are created
partly by the industry groups who comply with them, this regime may
incentivize these industry groups to delay the crafting and
implementing of new safety measures." 3 This focus on industry may
107. Id.
108. See id. at 20-21, n.30.
109. The National Commission for Product Safety was the original agency created in
1967 to assist in rulemaking for potentially hazardous goods and products. In 1972, it was
replaced by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. See Anthony Sciascia, Note, Safe
or Sorry: How the Precautionary Principle is Changing Europe's Consumer Safety
Regulation Regime and How the United States' Consumer Product Safety Commission
Must Take Notice, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 689, 691-92 (2006).
110. See id. at 694.
111. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 105, at 27.
112. Id. at 9.
113. Sciascia, supra note 109, at 695, n.40 (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n
Reauthorization: Hearing on H.R. 2271 and H.R. 2201 Before the Subcomm. On Health
and the Env't of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 63-68 (statement of
Sharon Nelson, Legislative Counsel, Washington Office of Consumers Union)).
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also increase the potential for development of weaker standards 14 that
industry can easily comply with. In terms of international standard
development, critics have also noted an accountability problem, as the
international organizations that create these standards are far removed
from the consumers who will ultimately be affected by their decisions. 115
Finally, while the theory of harmonization resulting from these
voluntary-standard organizations is promising, the reality is that these
standards are not harmonized at all. In the United States, for example,
there are about 400 voluntary-standard writing bodies, and the system
has been described as a "hodgepodge of sources of standards rather than
a neat pyramid with ANSI at the apex."116 This disorganization stands
in stark contrast to the voluntary-standard regime in Europe, which
requires manufacturers to comply with voluntary standards or meet the
same safety requirements with a comparable approach.1 17 The European
regime has attempted to integrate voluntary safety standards into its
regulatory regime, and this approach has led to a decrease in product
liability litigation.118  Once these voluntary standards become
incorporated into a regulatory regime, however, they lose their
voluntary nature altogether and might as well be referred to as
traditional regulation. While the European approach may provide
success for products liability in the domestic sense, it still leaves the
global market with a lack of consistent standards across borders and a
growing jumble of regulatory requirements to keep track of.
IV. A GLOBAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY REGIME TO INCREASE AND
HARMONIZE SAFETY STANDARDS
As demonstrated in Part III.A, market forces have the ability to
influence private actors in the global marketplace to engage in private
lawmaking that increases the safety standards for a particular product.
This approach achieves the increase in safety standards that would
protect consumers from the risk of unsafe products entering the market
but does not achieve the harmonization that is desirable for
manufacturers. Voluntary standards, which allow standard
development on a global scale, can help bridge this gap by creating a
single source of safety criteria for manufacturers in the global market.
114. See Lori M. Wallach, Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization: The
WTO, NAFTA, and International Harmonization of Standards, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 823,
863 (2002).
115. Id.
116. Hamilton, supra note 96, at 1343; see also Howells, supra note 18, at 323.
117. See Howells, supra note 18, at 324.
118. See id. at 345.
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In order to create a global products liability regime that both increases
and harmonizes safety standards for consumer products, this Note
proposes a regime that utilizes a combination of these two private
approaches.119
The first step in instituting this regime would require that ISO (and
ultimately the domestic standard-writing organizations, such as ANSI,
that have a role within ISO) begin utilizing a "hard law"'120 approach for
the adoption of its voluntary standards. The current approach taken by
ISO, which lacks inherent legal enforceability, is a form of "soft law."'121
Voluntary standards exemplify the core of soft law, which requires
"open, consensus, multi-stakeholder dialogue, often including
government, firms, and civil society, to produce the many international
standards and voluntary programmes that emerge." 122 Soft law may
come in the form of certification, 123 and currently, parties who wish to
advertise their compliance with ISO standards must go through a
certification or accreditation process for the product. However, this
process is initiated by companies wishing to add credibility to their
products or brand, so adherence is mainly enforceable at the request of
the company.124
In order to implement a hard-law approach, this Note suggests that
ISO engage in private lawmaking by requiring a contractual obligation
from parties who wish to advertise compliance with the voluntary
standards. 125 Instead of a soft-law certification process, manufacturers
119. There is an assumption in the literature that global harmonization must take place
through regulatory innovation in a dominant state; however, private actors also can
emerge to provide the collective response necessary to solve a transnational problem. See
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 3, at 44, 49-52.
120. Hard law "refers to legally binding obligations that are precise (or can be made
precise through adjudication or the issuance of detailed regulations) and that delegate
authority for interpreting and implementing the law." Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A.
Pollack, Hard Versus Soft Law in International Security, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1147, 1160 (2011)
(quoting Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT'L ORG. 421, 421 (2001)).
121. See id.
122. John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock, Introduction: Hard Choices and Soft Law
in Sustainable Global Governance, in HARD CHOICES, SOFr LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS
IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 3, 22-23 (John J. Kirton &
Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2004).
123. See id. at 22.
124. See Certification.... ISO, http://www.iso.org/isolhome/standards/certification.htm
(last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (describing the process of certification and ISO's involvement).
125. Currently, some global corporations make adherence to ISO standards a
requirement to obtain a contract, but they do not specifically write the ISO standards into
their contracts. As such, a third-party's claim of ISO compliance "does not necessarily
guarantee compliance with regulations." Michael E. Cloghesy, A Corporate Perspective on
Globalisation, Sustainable Development, and Soft Law, in HARD CHOICES, SoFT LAw:
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will enter into a contract with the standard-writing organization, and
this contract will provide baseline standards that are compliant with
standards of all jurisdictions in the world and deemed "safe" by the
organization. This contractual obligation will provide a compliance
incentive for global manufacturers, many of whom already comply with
ISO guidelines, 126 because the standards written in this contract will
provide assurance that any product manufactured under the stated
guidelines can be sold and marketed anywhere in the world. This will
provide the kind of harmonization that manufacturers desire and will
lessen the risk of unsafe products entering the market. ISO can then
continue its current certification process, the only difference being that
when the organization finds noncompliance, this will result in a
potential lawsuit for breach of contract rather than a mere refusal of
certification. This contractual obligation between the standard-writing
organization and the companies that comply will increase the legitimacy
of voluntary standards, 127 which will in turn increase the regime's
chances of achieving harmonization.
The contracts drafted by the voluntary-standard organizations, such
as ISO, should provide baseline safety guidelines and require that the
manufacturers include these same provisions into any contracts with
suppliers, buyers, or other third-party vendors. These provisions can be
added into the already existing contracts with third parties, perhaps
even in a separate section, and will only concern the safety standards of
the products being developed. 128 By mandating that manufacturers
include these provisions in their third-party contracts, the proposed
regime will extend the reach of these voluntary standards and
ultimately protect more consumers in the global market. Because these
contracts-either between the voluntary- standard organization and the
manufacturer or between the manufacturer and third parties-will be
entered into on a purely voluntary basis between private parties, they
constitute a form of private lawmaking. 129 Moreover, the competitive
nature of today's global market and the ability of consumers to induce
VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE,
supra note 122, at 323, 327.
126. See Wirth, supra note 89, at 83.
127. See Kirton & Trebilcock, supra note 122, at 11 ("Hard law offers the legitimacy, the
strong surveillance and enforcement mechanisms, and the guaranteed resources that soft
law often lacks.").
128. The provisions written into the manufacturer's contracts will have no effect on
other negotiated provisions, such as choice of law, jurisdiction, waiver, notice, liability, etc.
The provisions will only mandate safety requirements, the breach of which may result in
legal action. Further, if a breach of safety requirements ultimately leads to consumer
injury, the party who breached the requirements will be held liable.
129. See Snyder, supra note 59.
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manufacturers to improve their own safety standards will maintain a
presence under this regime, as slightly altering the landscape of
voluntary standards will still leave room for innovation and
technological advances of manufacturers.
An additional benefit of the proposed regime is that the
shortcomings of voluntary standards can be mitigated by private
lawmaking. First, voluntary standards lack inherent force of law, 130 but
adding contractual obligations through private lawmaking will give
these standards the legal authority they currently lack. Second, the
perverse-incentive problem that arises in the voluntary-standard
context (i.e., incentives for industry to delay crafting or implementing
safety measures 131) will be mitigated as manufacturers continue to
compete with one another to implement the most innovative and high-
tech safety standards. 132 Finally, the lack of harmonization that
currently exists within the voluntary standard regime 33 will no longer
frustrate the ability of manufacturers to comply with these standards,
as their compliance with international voluntary standards will ensure
the marketability of their products in all jurisdictions around the world.
The regime proposed here is not meant to replace domestic
regulation of products, but rather to supplement such regulation in an
attempt to increase the safety of products entering the global stream of
commerce.' 34 Moreover, this proposal does not set out to address all the
complexities of the global market or to solve the increasing problem of
recalls for imported products. 135 By utilizing various forces existent in
today's market, this regime exemplifies an optimistic view of the
capability of global actors to institute a race-to-the-top dynamic for
safety standards and compliance. Even if this regime is only capable of
improving the safety of one product in today's market or one
manufacturer's operation, it will still lessens the risk of harm to global
consumers, and that is a worthwhile project.
130. See Lazzara, supra note 60.
131. Sciascia, supra note 109, at 695.
132. See, e.g., Healey, supra note 75.
133. See Howells, supra note 18, at 323.
134. See David Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct, in THE
POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION, supra note 3, at 151, 153 (explaining that, while private
lawmaking cannot replace state governance, "the long-term impact of private global
business regulation depends on the extent to which its standards for business conduct and
its mechanisms for holding firms accountable are integrated with and reinforced by state-
based regulatory policies at both the national and international levels").
135. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 25 (discussing the increasing number of automobile
recalls in 2013).
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CONCLUSION
In today's global market, the presence of TNCs and the trend to
outsourcing for cheap labor and production costs have created legal
complexities for manufacturers and regulators. These complexities have
resulted in uncertainty among manufacturers about which laws apply to
their products in the global stream of commerce, and this has ultimately
placed consumer health and safety at risk at the hands of substandard
or defective products. In order to eliminate this uncertainty for
manufacturers while simultaneously increasing safety standards, a
products liability regime that utilizes private lawmaking should be
introduced into the global market. By utilizing the most effective
aspects of voluntary standards and supplementing those standards with
private contractual lawmaking, the global market has the ability to both
harmonize and increase safety standards around the globe. In doing so,
the market will lessen the risk of injury or harm to consumers, thus
making today's global market much safer and more reliable than before.
